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The role of statisticians in society is to provide tools, techniques, and guidance with              
regards to how much to trust data. This role is increasingly more important with more               
data and more misinformation than ever before. The American Statistical Association           
recently released two statements on p-values, and provided four guiding principles. We            
evaluate their claims using these principles and find that they failed to adhere to them. In                
this age of distrust, we have an opportunity to be role models of trustworthiness, and               
responsibility to take it. 
 
It is widely believed that we currently live in a post-truth world. Evidence cited includes the                
emergence of “fake news” ​[1]​, the frequency of false or misleading statements from world              
leaders ​[2]​, social media companies’ refusal to regulate misleading political ads ​[3]​, the             
reproducibility crisis ​[4]​, and rampant misinformation about Coronavirus Disease 2019          
(COVID-19) ​[5]​. Theories of the causal factors leading to this situation include continual false              
promises from politicians, pundits, and other experts, the public having had “enough with             
experts” ​[6]​, and scientific publications with misleading or inaccurate results ​[7]​. 
 
This state of affairs should be, and is, deeply troubling to statisticians ​[8]​. Statistics can               
reasonably be thought of as a kind of quantitative epistemology. The epistemological belief             
underlying statistics mirrors philosophical ideas elaborated in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, in            
which Quine points out that there is no real distinction between analytic and synthetic truths, or,                
in other words, there is no Truth (with a capital T) ​[9]​. Statistics, rather than searching for Truth,                  
builds models of the world. George Box, a leading statistician of the 20​th century, famously               
quipped, “All models are wrong, some are useful ​[10]​.” In this sense, statistics enables the               
evolution of ideas ​[11]​, much like selective pressures enable the evolution of species. Although              
“survival of the fittest” is a typical characterization of selective pressure in evolution, a more               
accurate description is “survival of the fit enough”. In other words, evolution is not trending               
towards the most fit species ever. Rather, species continue to evolve as niches change.              
Similarly, in statistics, it is not the “survival of the fittest” model, but rather, “survival of the fit                  
enough.” Every experiment and every analysis is (at least implicitly) a model comparison, and              
the hope is to either gather evidence in favor of the existing model, or identify discrepancies                
from the model to improve, refine, or replace it. ​The role of statistics in society is to provide                  
selective pressure to existing models, weeding out those that are not deemed fit enough. 
 
It is the responsibility of the statistics community, therefore, to be epistemological role models.              
The key to validly assessing the fitness of a model rests in both the acquisition and analysis of                  
data. Statisticians have formalized these processes, combining prior knowledge with data to            
build evidence for or against any given hypothesis. In fact, we have developed many tools, with                
competing assumptions, and sometimes different conclusions ​[12]​. All approaches, however,          
begin with designing an experiment ​[13]​, and proceed to acquire data, followed by analyzing              
that data ​[14]​.  
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It is in this context that the American Statistical Association (ASA) has decided to end its silence                 
with regard to its perspective on statistical inference. In particular, ASA released a statement in               
2016 discussing the perils of p-values ​[15] (which we refer to hereafter as ASA I, following                
Deborah Mayo’s convention ​[16]​. More recently, the ASA took a further step, publishing an              
editorial recommending the elimination of the dichotomization of p-values, that is, they            
recommended that the language “statistically significant”, essentially, be banned ​[17] (which we            
refer to as ASA II). They provide a number of reasons for their conclusions, as well as some                  
value-based guidance on how to proceed. ASA II provides a mnemonic, ATOM, which             
summarizes its values: 
● Accept uncertainty, 
● be Thoughtful,  
● be Open, and  
● be Modest. 
 
The values espoused by the ASA seem appropriate for making any argument, whether it is               
statistical or not. We therefore evaluate the ASA statements on p-values, in light of these               
values. Concomitant with the publication of ASA II, the American Statistician also published 43              
commentaries, and Nature published a comment called “Retire Statistical Significance” (we refer            
to this as AGM hereafter) ​[18]​, which continues to be the publication with the highest Altmetric                
score ever to-date ​[19]​. The main question that motivates both ASA II and AGM is whether the                 
use of the term statistical significance accelerates or impedes scientific progress. This question,             
like any other empirical question, is one that can best be answered by designing a thoughtful                
experiment, carefully acquiring data, and honestly analyzing it.  
 
The central thesis of this document is that the ASA II does not reflect best practices with regards                  
to either empiricism or its espoused values: no experiments to evaluate its claims are conducted               
or provided, nor does it follow the ATOM guidelines. It may continue to be socially acceptable                
for politicians or pundits to argue without quantitative evidence in support of their claims, without               
accepting uncertainty, being thoughtful, open, or modest. But statisticians can be held to a              
higher epistemological standard, a standard that we invented and continue to refine.  
 
Below, I delve further into the four values that ASA II espouses. For each of the four values, we                   
state the value, followed by a quote from ASA II (which is itself typically a quote from one of the                    
43 presented commentaries) that summarizes the value, and then evaluate the           
recommendations of ASA II in light of that value. I then propose an ASA III, which can be a                   
model of living up to these values. 
 
1. Accept uncertainty  
 
So it is time to…”move toward a greater acceptance of uncertainty and embracing of              
variation” ​[20]​.  
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Section 2 of ASA II is titled, “Don’t Say ‘Statistically Significant.’” Presumably, the authors are               
relatively certain that stating “statistical significance” is net negative. The section concludes            
blithely with, “In sum, ‘statistically significant’—don’t say it and don’t use it.” No acceptance of               
uncertainty or embracing of variation is implied or stated in this section, with regards to               
whether/when one can/should say the phrase. This is despite the fact that many of the               
commentaries on both ASA I and ASA II, jointly published, express uncertainty of this              
conclusion, and embrace variation. In fact, Section 5 of ASA II includes several quotes              
expressing both greater uncertainty and an embrace of variation. For example, Greenland is             
quoted as saying ​[21]​: 
 
The core human and systemic problems are not addressed by shifting blame to p-values              
and pushing alternatives as magic cures—especially alternatives that have been subject           
to little or no comparative evaluation in either classrooms or practice, 
 
implying the need for empirical investigations of these claims, rather than blanket statements.             
Section 5 also quotes Fricker et al. ​[22]​, which empirically evaluated the impact of the journal                
Basic and Applied Social Psychology banning all of inferential statistics, including the phrase             
“statistically significant.” That study found that when authors were forbidden from using            
statistical inference, studies tended to overstate, rather than understate their claims, providing            
evidence that some proposals had the opposite of the desired impact. Section 5 also              
acknowledges that after asking authors in the special issue to identify when p-value thresholds              
are permissible, they provided four distinct types of scenarios.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the recommendation of ASA II is to report continuous               
(i.e., exact) p-values, rather than dichotomizing: 
 
Where p-values are used, they should be reported as continuous quantities (e.g., p =              
0.08). 
 
Interestingly, reporting an exact p-value is antithetical to the ethic of accepting uncertainty for a               
number of reasons. First, p-values can rarely be computed exactly. This is because of the               
definition of p-values: the probability (under the null) of observing a test statistic more extreme               
than the observed test statistic. To ​exactly compute this null distribution requires being able to               
compute it for the particular observed sample size. However, it is extremely rare that we have a                 
closed-form solution to this problem. Whenever we lack closed-form solutions for the null             
distribution of the test statistic for a given sample size, we must ​approximate the p-value,               
typically using one of two approaches. The first approach approximates the distribution of the              1
test statistic under the null ​asymptotically​. This approach results in essentially all classical             
1 ​Even if we did not have to approximate computing the p-value, we would still have to ​report 
approximate p-values in most cases. This is because the p-value, in general, is not a number 
with only a few significant figures (in fact, it is not necessarily even a rational number).  
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statistical tests, including t-tests, ANOVA, etc. This is an approximation because we never have              
infinite data in practice. The second approach approximates the distribution of the test statistic              
under the null using resampling approaches, such as bootstrap or permutation. There is no finite               
number of bootstraps one can sample to get an exact p-value. Similarly, the number of               
permutations one must compute to obtain an exact p-value is typically astronomically,            
super-exponentially high (except for a few cases, such as Fisher’s exact test). Specifically, it is               
the number of permutations of the number of samples (“n!”). In practice, analysts compute a tiny                
fraction of the possible permutations. Perhaps the authors of ASA II did not mean “exact”, but                
rather, “don’t dichotomize”. There is a spectrum from exact to dichotomized, and if they meant to                
choose somewhere on the spectrum, further guidance would be desirable. 
 
In light of all this, a short summary of what Section 2 might have said, had it followed the dictum                    
of accepting uncertainty, is this: 
 
We believe that it is typically the case that stating that a result is “statistically significant”                
is net negative with regard to scientific progress, meaning that it will either increase the               
likelihood of reporting a false discovery, or decrease the likelihood of finding a true              
discovery, all else being equal. Moreover, we believe that all models are wrong, and              
some are useful; therefore, all null models are false, so statistical significance can simply              
reflect sample size. The direct empirical evidence in support of our belief of the net               
negativity of dichotomizing results on the basis of p-value thresholds is limited.            
Nonetheless, we recommend, instead, reporting an approximate p-value, such as, p ​≈            
0.08 (and we recommend reporting only a few significant digits determined by sample             
size)​. We acknowledge that there are situations for which stating that a result is              
statistically significant is helpful, such as industrial quality control and pre-registered           
medical trials, assuming the inferences are conducted honestly and appropriately. We do            
not propose guidelines for when we deem stating a result is statistically significant is net               
positive, but rather, suggest that future empirical investigations are warranted to           
determine suitable concrete guidelines. 
  
2. Be thoughtful 
 
Statistically thoughtful researchers begin above all else with clearly expressed          
objectives…. “[In thoughtful research] modeling assumptions (including all the choices          
from model specification to sample selection and the handling of data issues) should be              
sufficiently documented so independent parties can critique, and replicate, the work”           
[23]​…. “Thoughtful research prioritizes sound data production by putting energy into the            
careful planning, design, and execution of the study” ​[24]​. Thoughtful research includes            
careful consideration of the definition of a meaningful effect size. 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the most difficult component of research is in asking the right                
questions, not making inferences. What is the right question to ask here? One option would be:                
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is computing p-values and/or stating that results are statistically significant net positive or net              
negative for science? Profitably answering this question, like most others, warrants being            
thoughtful, as described above. What is the appropriate notion of effect size to characterize the               
scientific value of p-values and statistical significance? What is a reasonable experimental            
design? Who should conduct this experiment, and how should the results be reported such that               
interested independent parties can critique, replicate, and extend this work? None of these             
questions are asked or answered in ASA I or II or AGM.  
 
A related research question would be: which of the many proposed alternatives to reporting              
p-values and/or statistical significance would be most beneficial to science ​[25]​? Thoughtfully            
answering this question would benefit from understanding the primary causal factors leading to             
the inefficacy of reporting statistical significance. For example, if the main source of difficulty is               
in ​understanding ​p-values, then any approach that supplements p-values with additional           
statistical quantities is not likely to resolve the problem, as then individuals may need to               
understand both p-values and something else.  
 
Based on this, a paragraph to follow the first proposed paragraph, in alignment with the value of                 
thoughtfulness, may read like this: 
 
A key next step to understand the trustworthiness of various data analytic approaches is              
to further study them, for example, by studying reproducibility of results across varying             
inferential techniques, including p-values and statements of significance. We therefore          
call on various funding mechanisms, including government and private funding sources,           
to announce mechanisms to study the trustworthiness of different strategies. Such           
funding mechanisms will provide a much needed incentive to researchers to design            
studies which investigate these issues. To increase the reproducibility of the resulting            
studies, we suggest they include a mandatory pre-registration and/or validation dataset.           
This will guarantee that effect size is meaningfully defined ​a priori​, and that interested              
independent parties can critique and replicate the work.  
 
3. Be Open 
 
“[W]e should base judgments on ​evidence and careful reasoning, and seek wherever            
possible to eliminate potential sources of bias” ​[26]​.....To be open, remember that one             
study is rarely enough. 
 
Evidence supporting the net negativity of claims of statistical significance is largely missing from              
ASA I and II, perhaps because the authors believe the evidence is either “self-evident” or               
otherwise available (though some evidence suggests the opposite ​[22]​). And while careful            
reasoning is subjective, it has been extensively studied. One particularly salient effort related to              
this is the ​Good Judgement Project​, spearheaded by Professor Phillip Tetlock.  
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However, evidence in support of the proposed alternatives, or even to support discontinuing the              
use of “statistically significant,” is lacking from ASA I and II (AGM does provide empirical               
evidence of wrong interpretations of significance in the literature). Moreover, potential sources            
of bias are not acknowledged, much less eliminated, in either document. “Expert Political  
Judgment: How Good Is It” is a book that summarizes Tetlock’s work over 20 years of asking                 
people to make predictions ​[27]​. He concludes that most categorizations are not useful for              
distinguishing people into groups of those who make predictions better than chance, and those              
who do not. This includes categorizations based on level of education or expertise, political              
persuasion, etc. Tetlock does find, however, that expert judgement does depend on one’s ability              
to contemplate counterfactuals, or potential outcomes. That is, individuals who expressed both            
sides of an argument were more likely to make accurate predictions than those who only               
expressed rationale in favor of their side of the argument. This process of contemplating              
counterfactuals is arguably necessary, though not sufficient, to consider an argument “carefully            
reasoned,” and therefore open to being wrong. Neither ASA II nor AGM provided any              
counterfactuals (AGM acknowledged the possibility of counterfactuals). Had ASA II          
acknowledged counterfactuals, it may have included a paragraph such as: 
 
One study is rarely enough, and this holds for the scientific/social impact of stating              
results are statistically significant. This is a further reason for funders to create             
mechanisms to study these issues. While we believe that stating results are statistically             
significant is net negative, this view is not universal. Indeed, statistical significance            
claims rose, at least in part, to combat overstated claims of effect. Moreover, the concept               
of statistical significance is sufficiently broad, theoretically justified, and principled, such           
that it has been widely adopted and used for nearly a century. In fact, essentially all                
FDA-approved medical practices were approved on the basis of a statistically significant,            
pre-registered clinical trial. As Benjamini ​[28] stated, statistical significance “offers a first            
line of defense against being fooled by randomness, separating signal from noise,” and             
has thus been incredibly useful in a wide diversity of fields. In that sense, its scientific                
value has been extremely high, even though it also has had considerable costs. Perhaps              
these costs are due not to the statement of statistical significance, but rather, its              
misinterpretation and misuse.  
 
4. Be Modest 
Be modest about the role of statistical inference in scientific inference…. “Scientific            
inference is a far broader concept than statistical inference” ​[29]​... Because of the strong              
desire to inform and be informed, there is a relentless demand to state results with               
certainty…. Resist the urge to overreach in the generalizability of claims…. Accept that             
both scientific inference and statistical inference are hard, and understand that no            
knowledge will be efficiently advanced using simplistic, mechanical rules and          
procedures. 
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Donald Rubin, a famous statistician, quipped, “No causation without manipulation.” And yet, it             
seems that part of the premise of ASA I and ASA II is that a substantial contributing factor to the                    
distrust of analytical results is the use of post-acquisition data analysis techniques and claims.              
Being modest about the role of statistical inference in scientific inference goes both ways.              
Another result from Tetlock’s Good Judgement Project is the identification of a second quality              
that people who make accurate judgements have: modesty. More specifically, they update their             
posteriors given new data, rather than assuming the data are wrong in some fashion. In light of                 
this, ASA III could include the following paragraph: 
The causal factors underlying the distrust are undoubtedly myriad and multifarious. We            
believe that data analysis procedures are at least partially to blame. That said, poor data               
measurement, low sample sizes, lack of validation datasets, and existing incentive           
structures likely play a contributory role. Experiments in which we vary only the data              
analysis could resolve these issues, and so we advocate for such experiments to be              
funded and conducted. If the data indicate that whether or not one writes “statistically              
significant” is not meaningful, or does not play a large negative role in the replication               
crisis, our recommendation was wrong. On the other hand, experiments may find the             
main difference between (i) results that replicate and (ii) those that do not, is that those                
that replicate always have a validation study. If that were the case, or something like it, it                 
could focus our energy on developing new and more efficient ways of obtaining             
validation data ​[30]​, which would be a very different focus than discussing the relative              
merits and demerits of p-values and significance. Regardless, in light of being modest,             
we recommend that every scientific study reports approximately one hypothesis, and           
therefore, reports approximately one p-value, quantified using a registered analysis          
procedure on a validation dataset. For those without such a validation dataset, we             
recommend reporting results as exploratory (which they are) rather than confirmatory           
(which they are not).  
4. Concluding Thoughts 
 
To repeat Greenland’s ​[21]​ summary, 
 
The core human and systemic problems are not addressed by shifting blame to p-values              
and pushing alternatives as magic cures—especially alternatives that have been subject           
to little or no comparative evaluation in either classrooms or practice... What we need              
now is to move beyond debating only our methods and their interpretations, to concrete              
proposals for elimination of systemic problems. 
 
We agree. Perhaps more importantly, we, as statisticians, can take this opportunity to be role               
models, reach conclusions ideally after careful evidence-based analysis, and make policy           
recommendations also only after careful policy analysis. Trust in scientists is on the rise ​(Trust               
and Mistrust in Americans’ View...)​. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic makes our responsibility            
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of being trustworthy all the more urgent and important, because only by virtue of the application                
of statistical tools will we as a global society be able to determine when we are safe again. 
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